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INTRODUCTION
Airline regulation began with the A1r Commerce Act of 1926. This 
act allowed anyone who compiled with the safety requirements outlined 
1n the bill to operate air service. The main objective of this bill 
was to Impose a level of operational safety on the airline Industry.
At this time there existed two types of air carriers. The most 
Important type was the airmail contractors who flew established routes 
and transported persons, property, and mall. The second type consisted 
of people operating flying schools, cropdusltng services, etc. who 
transported persons and property to any location whenever the opportuni­
ty arose.
In 1938 the C1v11 Aeronautics Act replaced the Act of 1926. It 
Increased safety regulation and Imposed economic regulation of the same 
type used on public utilities. The economic regulation consisted of 
elimination of mall contract bidding and forced air carriers to obtain 
certificates allowing them to transport persons, property and mail on 
fixed routes. It allowed subsidies to air carriers 1n the form of mall 
pay, 1t controlled rates, and 1t allowed the board control over all actions 
between air carriers whether the action was between multiple air carriers 
or between air carriers and other forms of transportation. The act also 
allowed exemption from regulation under special board approved conditions 
and 1t permitted Issuance of certificates to the then existing air carriers.
The Initial awarding of certificates went to the air mall contractors
2who have since evolved Into the "trunkline" carriers which haul persons 
and cargo over the principle air routes.
The second type of carrier, the "fixed-base carrier", received ex­
emptions from many regulations Including the need for a certificate.
These operators evolved Into the "air taxi" Industry.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 established three administrative 
branches; the "Civil Aeronautics Authority" which exercised judicial and 
legislative functions, the "Air Safety Board" which Investigated and re­
ported on accidents and also made further safety recommendations, and an 
"Administrator of Civil Aeronautics" who developed civil airways and air 
navigation facilities.
In 1940 these organizations were reorganized Into two separate 
branches each with Its own 11st of well-defined functions. The first 
branch was the C1v1l Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) whose functions were:
1. the regulation of the economic aspects of United States 
air carriers both domestically and Internationally, In­
cluding the Issuance and withdrawal of operating author­
ity 1n the form of a certificate or exemption, the fix­
ing of rates 1n certain areas, control over Interlock­
ing relationships, control over abandonment of service, 
compelling adequate service, etc;
2. the control of entry of foreign air carriers Into 
United States territory and cooperation with the State 
Department 1n obtaining and granting reciprocal air 
rights with foreign nations;
3. the promulgation of safety standards for all aircraft 
flight and for aircraft and air carriers;
4. the suspension and revocation of safety certificates; and
5. the Investigation of aircraft accidents. 1
3The second branch m s  the Civil Aeronautics Administration that had 
responsibility for:
1. operation of the civil airways (Including air traffic con­
trol) and control towers at najor airports:
2. policing the Industry to secure compliance with safety 
regulations. Including where necessary the filing and 
prosecution of complaints before the Board for suspension 
or revocation of safety certificates:
3. Issuance of various types of safety certificates under 
standards prescribed by the Board:
4. promulgation of safety regulations:
5. Investigation of aircraft accidents 1n certain cases under 
del gated authority from the Board:
6. administration of the Federal Airport Act which provides 
for assistance to States and municipalities In airport 
development: and
2
7. operation of the Washington National Airport.
In 1958t due t.u a number of m1d-a1r collisions. Congress passed the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which created the Federal Aviation Agency 
(F.A.A.). This new organization had authority over the nation's air space 
and 1t regulated the use of this space by civilian and military aircraft.
The F.A.A. established rules, conducted research, and developed air 
navigation facilities. The C.A.B.'s safety regulation power was trans­
ferred to the F.A.A. along with the duties of developing civil airways and 
landing areas.
Under the Act of the C.A.B. was left with power over route allocation, 
accident investigation, control over forces, and control over the Issuing 
of certificates.
The Act also provided that military aircraft were exempt from air 
traffic rules during military emergencies and restricted air zones were
4created for security Identification of aircraft.
In 1967 Congress created the Department of Transportation which con­
tained the Federal Aviation Adm1n1stration. The Federal Aviation Admlnls- 
tratlon replaced the Federal Aviation Agency. Also, the C.A.B.'s Investi­
gative and safety related functions were transferred to a new Independent 
agency called the National Transportation Safety Board.
Although there had been changes 1n safety regulation, little change 
had occurred In economic regulation since 1938. By the early 1970s many 
people felt that this lack of change 1n economic regulation was hindering 
the airline Industry which had seen major changes during this time period.
Airline service and reliability had Improved while Its cost relative 
to other forms of transportation had decreased. Coupled with this cost 
drop other forms of transportation (Railroads and Steamships) were found 
Inferior 1n terms of time by most users. These two factors caused the air 
transportation market to expand rapidly.
Also, the United States airline system offered a higher level of ser­
vice and was the leading technical Innovator of any system 1n the world.
Both these advantages were combined with the further advantage of having 
the lowest fares for domestic mile of any country.
These advantages were eliminated 1n the 1960s by the development of 
cheap, large-scale Intra-European and transatlantic service by foreign coun­
tries.
This development was followed 1n the early 1970s by a large Increase 
1n airline passenger transportation and freight rates caused by a large In­
crease 1n the cost of fuel. This brought protests from many consumer groups
arguing that th* regulatory agencies had coated to carry out their Intended 
legal functions and that thay wart “captives" of the Industries they regu-
Ourlng that time, the philosophy of the Johnson and Nixon administra­
tions focused on less transportation regulation. Both administrations en­
dorsed less restricted entry and rate controls In surface f*o1ght trans­
portation/
Not until 1975 was focus shifted to airline regulation by a report 
from the Council of Economic Advisers. It states:
In the domestic airline Industry, regulation has served 
primarily to bring about a nonoptlmel choice of price and 
quality. . . Since their fares are regulated by the C.A.B., 
the airlines tend to compete on the basis of scheduling, over 
which the board does not exercise direct control. The result 
Is "excess capacity", and efforts to raise the regulated forces 
1n order to assure a return on investment greater than the In­
dustry's pars lived cost of capital serve only to set the stage 
for further capacity augmentation.
Carriers as a group have consequently tended to earn 
nelghet excess profits not losses, but the traveling public 
has paid higher fares because of the regulation-induced excess 
capacity. While excess capacity does yield soma benefit In 
the form of more frequent departures, less crowding, and a 
better change of obtaining a seat on the preferred departure, 
the vaule of this excess capacity Is almost surely less thin 
Its cost.
It concludes that the cost of airline regulation:
could be reduced substantially or even eliminated If entry 
Into and exit from markets ware made easier and If control over 
fares ware liberalized so as to encourage price competition. Un­
der such circumstances an Individual airline could attract more 
passengers by lowering Its price rather than Increasing 1ts total 
capacity. 5
These criticisms led to a debate over the need for economic regulation. 
Some parts of the airline Industry felt entry control was needed and that the
C.A.B. should decide the allocation of operating rights 1n a closed system.
Opposing these carriers were the expansion oriented airlines which 
felt that the public had a need for new services and competition. Accord* 
1ng to status-quo minded carriers, competition was felt to cause Imbalances 
In supply relative to demand— reflected 1n low load factors, low aircraft 
utilization rates, and over Investment— which resulted In lower profits, 
Inefficient economics, and higher prices.
Based on these criticisms the special staff of the C.A.B. conducted
C
a study on possible changes in the current regulatory policy. This policy 
had three basic elements. They were: 1.) granting of certificates to car­
riers! 2.) fare regulation; and 3.) mall transportation. The first two 
areas were the ones under debate while the policy toward mall transportation 
was generally acceptable to the airlines.
The federal Aviation net of 1958 had set down the guidelines for the 
granting of certificates. As enacted at that time the Act
1. prohibits an air carrier from engaging 1n any air trans­
portation without prior Board authorization;
2. outlines the standards and procedures relating to the 
Issuance of certificates of public convenience and 
necessity;
3. sets forth the various duties of certified carriers; and
4. prescribes the contents of certificates, their method of 
alteration, suspension, revocation, etc. 7
An application 1n writing must be submitted to the C.A.B. which can 
only be approved 1f the service outlined 1n the application 1s consistent 
with the public convenience and needs. These applications can be for either 
Permanent or temporary service.
7The party submitting the application must show the ability to finance 
initiate, and operate the given service. Also, United States citizenship 
1s required and foreign service 1s subject to Presidential approval.
A granted certificate specifies the terminal points and any inter­
mediate points for the service. Only service between these points 1s al­
lowed but scheduals, equipment, and level of service 1s generally left to 
the discretion of the recipient of the certificate.
The C.A.B. imposed expensive conditions on the certificates they Is­
sued. Provisions which applied to non-stop service, service patterns, and 
use of airports were all conditions imposed on certificates.
Once a certificate was granted, 1f service was not started v/ithln a 
designated time period the C.A.B. would cancel the certificate. Once ser­
vice started, the Board had the power to cancel or modify existing certifi­
cates whenever 1t felt the public would benefit by the change. These cer­
tificates were not transferrable between airlines.
Fares were also controlled by the 1958 Act. Every air carrier was 
required to file its fares with the C.A.B. to allow for public Inspection. 
Fares could only be changed with thirty days notice unless an exemption 
was granted by the C.A.B. The rates set by the airlines must be judged 
by the C.A.B. The rates set by the airlines must be judged by the C.A.B. 
to be fair and reasonable and must not show any prejudice for or against a 
given route in any way.
These two parts of the 1958 Act led to five major areas of debate 
over C.A.B. control. These areas were: overall C.A.B. policy, certifica­
tion of new air carriers, new routes for existing carriers, flexibility in
ait fares, and reduction or suspension of air service. Surrounding this 
legislation was the debate over how this regulation would affect I N  l1r» 
line industry as a whole.
The first area of debate was general C.A.B. policy. The current 
legislation direct the C.A.B. to prompts economical and efficient lir 
service by relying on competition only to the extent neteiiipy id IfeMikl 
predetermined goals. Proponents for deregulation argued that |Hi ^ H c l  
and quality of air service should be determined by free market forcii,
They argued that the C.A.B. set prices which are based or cost whlih:plWb¥ii 
incentive for efficient Mid economical service. Thus the more the alfMhti 
spent, the more they could charge for their flights. Because of this, llf* 
lines competed on the basis of quality and number of services offered knott­
ing that these costs would be covered by the ticket price set by the C.A.B.
A free market system would allow the price to float to the level where pas­
sengers felt the combination of price and service to be at its optimum.
According to proponents of deregulation the changes 1n the C.A.B. poli­
cy would require new interpretation of existing laws. However, this alone 
would not be enough. The laws themselves had to be revised. One of which 
is on the certification of new air carriers. Under the current law between 
1950 and 1974, 79 applications were received by C.A.B. from new companies 
for servicing domestic routes; none was granted. Also, 8 of the original 
19 certified trunk carriers which have ceased operation were never replaced 
by other carriers. This meant that the airline competition had been reduced
Q
over 40% under C.A.B. control.
The deregulation forces felt that new carriers had to be allowed to
9enter the market to ensure competition. Denying entry to new firms ex­
cluded the possibility of them offering lower fares and or Improved ser­
vice. The mere threat of new entries could lower prices and Improve ser­
vices.
Opponents of deregulation argue that allowing entry of new carriers 
will only lead to new carriers replacing old ones. The newcomers will use 
destructive price competition to establish themselves on new routes. If 
this happens on enough of the current airline routes, the carriers will 
not be able to absorb all their losses and will fold. This will leave the 
new carriers as replacements.
Another controversial area of the regulatory laws was the granting of 
new routes for existing ar1lines. Opponents of the deregulation reasoned 
that allowing existing carriers access to their competitors routes will re­
duce the profitability of prize routes. This would result, because the 
prize routes would be chosen for entry first. Without the profits contri­
buted by these routes, carriers would abandon service on marginal or unpro­
fitable routes, thus causing conmunltles to lose air service.
The pro-deregulation group contests that cross-subsidization doesn't 
taice piece at a significant level. Senator Kennedy stated:
There 1s no evidence to support the myth that 
airlines are providing significant money-losing 
service t© small cofrilpltles that 1s subsidized by 
highly pnefitable operations where the CAi protects 
them from competition. The dense and most popular 
markets am  already gulte competitive and the two, 
three, or mere carriers serving them generate little 
or no Hexcess* profit that these same carriers use 
to serving towns they jppuld prefer not to serve.
The fact is that CAf regulations positively discourage 
this kind of cross-subsidy. . . and, though some air­
lines continue to allege that substantial cross-subsidy
exists and 1s responsible for providing service to smell 
communities, they have been unable to present any evidence 
to support the claims. 9
Further arguments state that carriers always have Incentive to aban­
don unprofitable routes whether or not they have hlgly profitable routes. 
Therefore, Increasing entry would not threaten small communities with the 
loss of air service.
A third area of the law that deregulation proponents wanted changed 
was based on the flexibility 1n air fares. The current law allowed the 
C.A.B. to reject any tariff, giving 1t control over all air fare. Supporters 
wanted to decrease C.A.B.*$ power by only allowing It to reject fare Increases 
above 10 percent or below 25 percent of the existing fare.
Opponents thought that this change would result 1n cut-throat competi­
tion and predatory pricing. Also, service would be reduced 1n order to limit 
costs. This would leave consumers with Inferior air service and might harm 
the air transportation system.
Proponents felt that flexible pricing would allow firms to pass savings 
on to the consumers. This allows the consumer to decide on the level of ser­
vice versus price he deserves. The existing situation forces the consumer 
to pay more for the high levels of service offered.
The final area of the law debated was whether or not to allow carriers 
to reduce or stop service to a community. The change would require the C.A.B. 
to be given 90 days notice and would allow the C.A.B. to suspend service re­
duction up to 270 days thereafter, until a new carrier 1s found to service 
the route.
Opponents of the change 1n the law argue that this will disrupt service
11
to many small communities. Even when substitute service is arranged, the 
transition period of developing new fares and flight schedules would be 
disruptive.
Supporters of the change reason that free exit allows resources to 
be used more effectively on other routes. Also, the new legislation en­
sures that essential service will be provided continuously.
Aside from direct changes in the law 1f the deregulation bill ap­
proved, there was murh general debate over its effects. Advocates of de­
regulation argue that its passage would lead to a more efficient air trans­
portation system, characterized by a mix of fares and services which con­
sumers would prefer to those under the present system. Opponents argue 
that the world's best transportation system would be severely damaged if 
not controlled by non-market forces.
One of the areas debated 1$ that of introducing various levels of 
service and novelty services. Existing C.A.B. regulations prevent this. 
Proponents state that these types of service are needed and that an unregu­
lated market will allow them to be Introduced. Two examples pointed to are 
used by unregulated intrstate carriers. Pacific Southwest Airlines offers 
a choice between high-density seating/low fare air service and jet service 
on certain routes. In Texas, Southwest Airlines offers very low prices to 
off-peak travelers.^
On the other hand, opponents content that air fares are low enough 
already and that airlines do compete on services offered, the quality of 
service that is. This directly benefits travelers by offering increased 
service. They further argue that an unregulated market would only offer 
low fares by compromising on comfort due to cramped seating and infrequent
12
departures. The airlines would not be able to hold down costs except by 
cutting service and thus the entire quality of airline service would be 
jeopardized.
The effect of deregulation on fares and efficiency of operation was 
also disputed. Proponents argue that the major form o* competition open 
under regulation Is flight scheduling. These Increased flights result In 
many empty seats, thus increasing fares and reducing the efflclenty of 
operation. Also, because fates are allowed to Increase as costs rise, 
there Is no Incentive to stop this spiraling. Intrastate carriers were 
again cited as an example. Their load factors are consistently higher and 
their fares are also consistently lower than on comparable Interstate routes 
subject to C.A.B. regulation.
Opponents argue that U.S. fares are the lowest In the world and are 
Increasing at a lower rate than the unregulated sector of the economy. U.S. 
fares are 30 to 50 percent lower than European fares for comparable distances. 
Also, the price Index, based mostly on unregulated Industries, rcse 146 per­
cent between 1950 and 1976 while air fares rose less than 40 percent.
Deregulation might also decrease the number of routes serviced. Prop- 
ponents think that this will not happen. In cases where C.A.B. certified 
carriers abandoned markets, commuter air carriers have often taken over the 
route on a profitable basis. Service to small towns 1s not under control of 
the C.A.B. In terms of frequency or time of flights. And the C.A.B. seldom 
forces a particular route to be flown. The restrictions the board places 
on airline operations are primarily designed to keep competition out of pro­
tected markets, rather than compel service that would not otherwise be pro­
vided.
1 „4> -y  ■ » - ’
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Opponents contend that deregulation would, cause carriers to Increase 
their load factors, thus causing a reduction In flight frequency. To avoid 
further delays, stops In small communities will be canceled thereby elimi­
nating air service to many of them.
The chance that deregulation might lead to monopolies was also debated. 
Proponents argued that monopolistic practices could not exist In a free mar­
ket. A monopoly can only happen If other carriers cannot enter a monopolized 
market. Airplanes are the most mobile form of capital good known which makes 
entry Into a monopolized route easy. This case In entry will keep profit 
margin small In monopolized routes and therefore removes the advantage of 
total control of a route.
Opponents reason that this 1s an unrealistic view. If one airline 
lowers Its price on a route, all other airlines will also reduce their prices 
1n order to compete. The larger airlines will be better able to absorb 
losses which will lead to monopolies or oligopolies on most routes, charg­
ing excessive fares to travelers.
Deregulations' effect on safety was of major concern. Proponents felt 
that since safety 1s a responsibility of the FAA, Federal Aviation Administra­
tion and not of the C.A.B., air safety would not be affected.
Opponents say price cutting due to deregulation would cause airlines 
tc skimp on safety margins and aircraft maintenance. Consequently, the safe­
ty of the travelers might be jeopardized.
After much debate 1n Congress deregulation .bill S2493 was passed on 
September 21, 1978. This bill Instructed the C.A.B. to: 1.) place "maximum 
reliance" on competition 1n Its regulation of Interstate airline passenger 
service, so long as It ensured the safety of air travel; 2.) preserve ser­
14
vice to small cormunltles and rural areas, and 3.) prevent anti'Competitive 
practices.
In order to bring more competition to the airlines the bill: 1.) or­
dered the C.A.B. to authorize new services that were “consistent with the 
public convenience and necessity"; 2.) ordered the C.A.B. to grant operat­
ing r'ghts to any air carrier seeking to serve a route on which only one 
other carrier was actually providing service and on which other carriers 
were authorized to serve, but were not actually providing a specified mini­
mum level of service; 3.) required that 1f two or more airlines were actu­
ally providing service on such a route, the C.A.B. had to determine that 
granting additional route authority was "consistent with the public conveni­
ence and necessity" before permitting additional carriers to serve that 
route; 4.) required that an airline not providing the specified minimum 
level of service on a route begin providing such a service and retain Its 
authority to serve that route. Otherwise, the C.A.B. was required to revoke 
such unused authority; 5.) permitted carriers to lower rates fifty percent
below or five percent above the "standard Industry fare" without prior C.A.B. 
12
approval.
Should the Increase 1n competition lead to the loss of jobs the bill 
Included a clause to protect the workers. The bill made persons employed 
by an air carrier for at least four years eligible for compensation for a
maximum of six years 1f they lost their jobs, had their wages cut or were
13
forced to relocate due to Increased competition.
In order to retain service to small communities the bill: 1.) required 
an airline company to give the C.A.B. notice of Its Intent to suspend or re*
IS
duce service; 2.) required the C.A.B. to determine, within one year of the 
legislation's enactment, what 1t considered to be "essential air transpor­
tation" for each point served at the time of enactment. The board was 
authorized to re-evaluate and adjust, after consultation with local offi­
cials, what Is considered as constituting essential air service 1n the fu­
ture; 3.) authorized the C.A.B. to order an airline to continue to provide 
"essential air transportation service"; and, for a ten-year period, to pro­
vide subsidies or seek other willing carriers In order to assure the con-
14
tlnuatlon of essential service.
Finally, to prevent anti-competitive practices the bill required C.A.B. 
approval of airline consolidations, mergers, purchases, leases, operating 
contracts and acquisitions. The burden of providing the anti-competitive 
effects of such actions was placed on the party challenging an action. Air­
line company acquisitions by non-a1r11ne companies were exempted from the 
C.A.B.'s authority.15 A more complete list of the major parts of the deregu­
lation 1s given 1n the appendix.
This bill caused many changes 1n the Industry. Chapter one describes 
the airline's situation and plans for approaching deregulation 1n 1979. 
Chapter two tells how the Industry changed during the economic recession of 
1980. Chapter three describes the airlines'troubles and changes that oc­
curred In the early 1980s and that led to a push for deregulation which Is 
described 1n chapter four. Chapter five concludes the paper with a discus­
sion on maintaining deregulation policy.
I I
I. THE AIRLINE'S SITUATION AT THE TIME DEREGULATION PASSED
During 1978. while Congress was passing the deregulation bill, th-i 
airline Industry was enjoying a booming market brought about by the C.A.B.'s 
loosening of regulatory policy enforecement. In 1978 airlines carried two 
hundred and eighty million passengers, forty million more than 1n 1977.
The estimate for 1979 stood at three hundred million passengers cr twenty 
million more than In 1978.
This large growth 1n airline traffic was partially due to Alfred E.
Kahn who was appointed chairman of the C.A.B. in 1977. Mr. Kahn granted 
new routes to airlines and approved large fare discouts which were unheard 
of under past chairmen. He was a supported of deregulation because he felt 
that the airline should please customers first and should only please gevern- 
ment regulators second.
Because of the record growth under a loosening of the regulations 
policy, many people were optimistic about the future of airlines. They felt 
that airlines would continue to offer discount fares. T M s  wewld greatly in­
crease the number of passengers which would more than offset the lower reve­
nue obtained per ticket.
Although some routes would be dropped, others would be added. The 
cities where services were dropped would quickly be served by some small com­
muter or regional airline than could operate profitably at the lower load 
factor.
Also, small communities that had air service 1n 1978 were guaranteed
17
air service for the next ten years with the aid of government subsidies. 
This 1s actually an Increase In regulation 1n this area. Previously, the 
C.A.B. did not protect service to small comnunltles as shown by the fact 
that between 1965 and 1975 ooly nine new locations were added to the net­
works served by major carriers while service had stopped at more than 130
17
points.
Major carriers felt that they would be enable to continue service to
many snail communities but they felt that -unmuter airlines would fill the
void. The small carriers agreed with this philosophy as shown by written
support from over %  commuter carriers for the deregulation bill.
Commuter airlines support was strong for the bill because they come
off a record year 1n 1977. A record 8.5 million passengers traveled by
commuter airlines in 1977, an Increase of 16.4 percent ewer the previous
year. Since 1968, cemnuter airlines have successfully replaced scheduled
carriers In 53 cities, some with as few as two passengers a «ay. Meet ere
making money because they usesmaller planes, provide fewer frills, and have
10
1 ewer optr«ting costs.
Many people felt, however, that growth would be at only four to five 
percent a year during the early liSOs. This moderate growth did not scare 
the Industry because airlines felt that they could adjust to economic change 
better under a free enterprise system.
This belief 1n the airline’s ability to adjust was the basis for de­
regulation. By 1978 earnings were less than five percent of sales and 
these earnings were erratic since 1970. In 19J0 and 1975, many airlines 
had large losses. In the late 1970's more than one half of earnings came
18
from non-airline operations, compared with about 14 percent in 1966.
The industry's profit margin-earnings per dollar of sales-eroded. Since
the mid 1960's airline revenues have tripled but profits have not In-
19
creased correspondingly.
Airline executives felt that without government control they would 
be free to make the decisions necessary to stabilize the industry.
Many felt this stabilization would occur with expansion into new 
routes coupled with a reduction 1n dependence on the few most profitable 
routes which will have been moved Into by other carriers. This expansion 
would be carefully controlled however since balance sheets must be watched 
closely on every move. The days of excessive spending —  only to get re­
imbursed by raising fares —  was gone.
Expansion Into new routes and service schecullng on these new routes 
would be based only on return on Investment or an Increase 1n feeder traffic 
Into profitable routes. This would be a change from under regulation when 
expansion would often be based on achieving prestige.
Some airlines would try to build new hubs from smaller cities such as 
Saint Louis or Las Vegas while other airlines would try to jump into long- 
haul markets dominated by one carrier.
Regional airlines would also try to jump Into these monopoly routes 
1n order to become national airlines but they will simultanlously withdraw 
from routes determined as unprofitable. Again, small carriers would be re­
lied on to start service from these cities.
Although airlines would try to shift routes to gain profits, execu­
tives felt that operating costs had to be reduced to remain competitive.
19
Flying time per airplane per day would be Increased along with a decrease 
1n the number of employees per airplane. Flight attendants and airport 
staff would be trimmed which would lower service somewhat. Service would 
further be curtailed by a reduction 1n the number of first class seats 
and 1n-fl1ght meals.
It was felt that these cost cuts were necessary to offset the lower 
fares from the discounts Introduced to attract passengers. Although fares 
would be lower, airline's percentages of traffic might not Increase because 
all airlines on a given route would have equally low fares.
Also, these operating cost cuts were needed to offset large fluctua­
tions 1n traffic. Since discounts attract vacationers, load factors would 
be high during good economic times and would be low during poor economic 
years. Reduced costs would allow airlines to survive during off years.
The eleven major airlines at the time were planning to approach d e ­
regulation in very different ways. Because their structure and size varied 
from United's 3.1 billion dollar annual revenues to National's 589 million 
dollars their responses would range from planning mergers with other major 
airlines to slow careful expansion.
How each approached deregulation was based on four aspects: 1.) the
feeder markets available which allowed for traffic to be brought Into a
major route from shorter routes; 2.) the amount of competition on each
major route; 3.) the financial resources available to each carrier; and
20
4.) the age of each airline's fleet of planes.
Since these four factors differed for each airline, each approach to 
deregulation differed also. A summary of the eleven major carriers' approach-
20
es to deregulation 1s given by R. Loving Jr. 1n h1s article, "How the
airlines will cope with deregulation":
UNITED: With cash and other liquid assets that exceeded 
$800 million by 1979, United stood to benefit more from 
deregulation than any other carrier. The line’s strong 
balance shee would not only make 1t Invincible 1n any 
price war, but also would help 1t pay for Its recent order 
for $1.6 billion of new 767*s and 727*s to re-equ1p Its 
aging fleet. Moreover, its fleet of 335 airplanes enable 
1t to saturate markets 1t chose to enter while simultane­
ously defending Its best present markets. Not surprising­
ly, Richard J. Ferris, United's president advocated deregu­
lation when many other airline executives were heatedly op­
posing 1t. Preparing for the new freedom, United reopened 
dormant routes 1n every direction from Kanasas City, where 
1t built a thriving hub that offered stiff competition to 
TWA.
AMERICAN: Like United, American enjoyed a hefty cash hoard 
that made 1t a formidable foe. Also, like United, American 
was opon to attack on a number of Its monopoly routes, many 
of them 1n the Midwest and Southwest. American strengthened 
Its dominant position 1n the Southwest and California by add­
ing nonstop routes from there to Detroit, Indianapolis, and 
upstate New York.
TRANS WORLD: Lacking Its competitors' extensive feeder sys­
tem, the third of the B1g Three lost a great deal of Its 
Ch1cago-Ph11adelph1a traffic to United. The company had al­
ready ended losses by cutting back frequency and 1n-fl1ght 
service on Its once unprofitable Ch1cago-Los Angles runs. 
Needing more feeder routes, TWA used the liberalized entry 
rules to build long-distance spokes from Its largest hub,
St, Louis, adding flights west to such cities as Albuquerque 
and Honolulu. Although 1t had no such Intentions at the time 
TWA thought 1t could gain additional shorthaul routes by ac­
quiring a regional carrier such as Ozark or Hughes Alrwest.
EASTERN: After four years of slashing costs and Improving 
productivity, former astronaut Frank lorman pulled EAL out 
of a near-fatal tallspin. Although Eastern still had several 
problems, the line became a stronger competitor than at any 
time 1n the past ten years. Borman was withdrawing from low- 
yielding markets. Within one year EAL will have ended service 
to five small cities, most of them 1n the Southeast, and 
there would probably be more such pullbacks. Borman planned 
to redeploy h1s fleet southward and westward; he wanted fif­
teen new routes Into Latin America and six new westward spokes
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from the St. Louis hub.
PAN AMERICAN: Pan Am will enter the New York-Cal1fom1a 
market, and 1t planned flights from Miami to Houston and 
on to the West Coast as well. Its proposed acquisition 
of National would provide some feeder traffic for Pan An's 
overseas flights. The deal also would give Pan Am access 
to the Increasing flow of Western European tourists and 
businessmen who fly to Florida over routes served by Na­
tional. But the merger would make Pan Am the nation's 
second-largest carrier, and since the CAB has always been 
wary of letting the giants grow larger, there was only a 
fifty-fifty change 1t would approve.
DELTA: Fat earnings and a high level of employee produc­
tivity made Delta a powerhouse. The Atlanta-based carri­
er held few monopoly routes that interlopers could chal­
lenge, and Its superb hubs and feeder networks enabled 
1t to rip through the markets of other carriers like Sher­
man marching through Georgia. Although Delta planned to 
expand only gradually and carefully, It Intended to In­
vade the Northwest from Denver and extend Its Dallas-Pboanlx 
route to California. Instead of following the pack with 
big discounts to attract Incremental traffic, Delta will 
keep Its "economy" fares higher and concentrate on holding 
regular customers with cheaper rates for regular coach and 
first-class travel.
NORTHWEST: Like Delta, Northwest was a low-cost open 
and advantage that enabled 1t to underprice larger cjd 
tors. Northwest planned to harness more of the f§f#P traf­
fic from Its norther-route structure by adding fjlghts 
from the Twin Cities to the Southwest and San D1igo and from 
Chicago and Miami to Puerto R1co.
BRANIFF: Most travelers choose an airline because it has the 
most convenient timetable, so scheduling 1$ the most Impor­
tant art in airline management. Harding L. Lawrence, Branlff's 
chairman, was considered the Industry's scheduling genius. De­
regulation caused other carriers to cut back frequency on some 
routes, but Lawrence intended to continue h1$ profitable tactic 
of offering frequent service with narrow bodied aircraft. 
Branlff added thirty-seven airplanes to its fleet, and, unlike 
other trunks, took advantage of deregulation to build up Its 
system by noply1ng for some 400 new routes, many of them from
or
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Dallas to the Midwest, Northeast, and Europe. Lawrence 
planned more spokes from h1s small hub at Denver, and 
ha wanted to create a new hub at Las Vegas and possibly 
one at Reno.
WESTERN: Most of Western's profits came from only six 
of the s1xty-s1x segments In Its 33, 372 mile route 
structure. Merging with Its neighbor, Continental, 
would add feeder traffic to some of those marginal routes. 
But some profitable routes would be threatened by Inva­
sion! front the |1b Three. Moreover, Western flew an aging 
fleet of j« :k, end It needed the added financial strength 
of ContlneMlIi -- WlHfh had a new fleet that was nearly 
paid for —  to re-equip fast enough to keep pace with the 
new competition. Without the merger, Western would buy 
new airplanes more slowly, pull out of many marginal routes 
and concentrate Its fleet wherever 1t can make the most 
money.
CONTINENTAL: With only 3.3 percent of all trunk-line 
revenues, Continental argued that 1t must merge with 
Western In order to compete against the B1g Three in the 
new environment. The merger would give Continental more 
feed at Its Los Angeles hub. It also would create a huge 
hub at Denver, adding Western's eight spokes to Continental 
fourteen. That weulo put both carriers 1n position to 
reach out to such eastern cities as Philadelphia, Cleveland 
and Detroit on routes now dominated by the B1g Three. If 
the CAB rejects the merger, the airline would probably ex­
pand anyway —  but far more cautiously.
NATIONAL: It stretched across the Sunbelt, one of the na­
tion's best growth markets, but 1t lacked the large hubs 
that fed most of Its competitors. Though 1t was short of 
feeder markets, National pulled out of two small Florida 
cities that were unprofitable. Moreoever, It would soon 
face competition from at least one large carrier on Its 
rich Houston-Las Vegas monopoly route. Probably the weak­
est of the trunks, National was a prime merger candidate,
1f not with Pan Am or Texas International, perhaps with a 
regional carrier such as Allegheny. 21
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II, ONE YEAR AFTER DEREGULATION PASSED
At the end of 1979, one year after deregulation was in place, the 
outlook for airlines looked very different. The normal cycle was for 
the airline industry to hit a recession every five years and 1t looked as 
1f 1980 was going to keep the tradition going. The airlines were for the 
first time ever, going to have to face the recession alone. No longer 
would the C.A.B. support prices to keep an airline from going under which 
seemed a strong possibility at this time.
Whether or not an airline survived depended on how much traffic 
fell, how long the recession lasted, and the increase 1n the price of jet 
fuel. New commuter lines were felt to be 1n trouble but so was Eastern, 
TWA, and 8ran1ff. This feeling was based on these companies1 large number 
of fuel-Inefficient jets.
There was little worry over Delta's and Northwest's modern planes 
and solid financial grounding but many people felt these were the only two 
worry-free air carriers.
This pessimistic outlook was based on many airline's substantial 
drop 1n profits or even losses. This situation was very different from the 
time when deregulation was Implemented. Then the economy was booming and 
the number of passengers was Increasing. By the end of 1979 times had 
changed.
One of the worst aspects of the shift 1n the economy was that the 
airlines had to shift their approach to deregulation during bad times be-
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fore their approaches during good times had been tested. Many airline 
executives believed that deregulation would be a major asset 1n aiding 
them through the recession because 1t allowed airlines to be more re­
sponsive to consumer demands. As C.E. Meyer Jr., president of TWA, 
said,
'Deregulation has given us more flexibility to 
move our equipment around, to use 1t more productively, 
and that's got to help everybody. As to how well each 
Individual carrier will be able to accept the recession­
ary environment, I think there are going to be major 
differences depending on how well the carrier has used 
the last two or three years to restructure Itself.' 22
The large jump 1n fuel prices 1n 1979 was a major cause of the airline's 
worry. During the last six months of 1979 prices Increased so rapidly that 
Industry experts based their estimates for 1980's average Industry fuel 
costs by 9.5 percent.
Not all airlines were affected equally by the jump 1n oil prices. An 
example 1s Western Airlines whose main supplier was Union 011 Company of 
California which bought most of Its crude oil on the spot market. This 
caused Western's average fuel cost to jump from under 71 cents per gallon 
to 80 cents per gallon which was higher than the estimator* for the Industry 
average for 1980. Since Western used 420 million gallons of fuel 1n 1979, 
each one cent price Increase cost 4.2 million dollars. These Increases 
raised the fule cost to over 27 percent of total expenses versus 20 percent 
1n January 1979.
These large cost Increases meant that fleets of fuel-Inefficient air­
planes had to be grounded before the end of their useful life. Over 500 
large bodied planes that were designed before 1960 were lost.
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This grounding raised two questions for alrllnt management:
1.) Because extremely fuel efficient 767 jets would not be available 
until 1983, should and airline buy less efficient 727 replacements at 
the end of 1979 or should they wait and fly the fuel Inefficient planes?; 
and 2.) If a significant portion of the fleet was grounded causing a de­
crease 1n air service, would angry communities push to reregulate the In­
dustry?
Each airline answered these questions differently but one Item they 
all agree on was cutting back some service. An explanation for these cut­
backs was given by United's president Ferris:
'As fuel prices Increase, fares will increase. As 
fares Increase, load factors will go down, and as load 
factors go down, you may have to reduce the amount of 
product you put out for sale. That means fewer schedules.'23
This was not supposed to be a result of deregulation but at the time 
1t passed no one expected the occurrences 1n Iran which caused the fuel 
prices to Increase.
Many people felt that the future of each airline was based on their 
ability to cut unprofitable routes while at the same time expanding Into 
new growth markets. Although the approach was going to be the same as a 
year earlier, the feasibility of successfully accomplishing 1t was much 
lower. New growth markets would be difficult to find and with the decrease 
1n sales due to the recession the capital needed for expansion would be 
difficult to obtain. Also, the unprofitable routes serviced could not al­
ways be dropped now since a slower growth rate In new markets would use 
less of the capital left unused by the cutting of service on a route. This 
meant that some unprofitable routes or even routes that lose money might
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still have to be serviced just to cover the fixed costs of the capital 
which serviced the route. This would put a squeeze on an airline's cash 
flow which would further reduce its ability to expand while simultaneous­
ly forcing 1t to keep old routes that become unprofitable. An airline
that got trapped 1n this way would have a good change at bankruptcy before
24
the end of the recession.
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HI. CHANGES DURING THE 1980'S
During 1980 the alrli.ie Industry began to stabilize. The period 
of route expansion, price wars, and' strong competition seemed over along 
with the erosion of profits caused by them.
Carriers started to expand with safe routes that connected their 
hub-and-spoke systems by Increasing the frequency of flight or by add­
ing connecting routes. This strengthened the carriers1 positions and 
better allowed them to meet challenges from other airlines.
8ecaute of the airlines1 new defensive policy challenges were fewer 
which meant lower discounts on fares and Increased revenues.
A111ne executives felt that the 1980 recession tested their ability 
to respond to bad economic times. They felt that airlines were extremely 
hard hit because they had a combination of less traffic while fuel costs 
doubled.
In response to the severity of the recession, air carriers quickly 
became leaner, quicker to respond to change, and more able to use the 
nwe freedom offered by deregulation. This freedom had both positive and 
negative aspects. Some of the positive ones are freedom 1n scheduling 
pricing, market entry and exit, specialization and flexibility 1n cost 
control.
Negative aspects are the remaining economic regulation, the unmatched 
routes and equipment from rapid expansion under deregulation, and the labor 
protection given 1n the deregulation act.
mBy this time deregulation had led to airlines1 developing strong 
hubend-spoke systems, entering and exiting markets with ease, and the 
departure of trunklines from small community service. Delta and North­
west airlines were 1n the strongest position because of their fleets of 
fuel efficient aircraft. They both moved slowly and cirefully under de­
regulation and were successfully entering new markets while holding on 
to solid shares of their eld routes.
Still, the other airTimet were not giving up* They cut back opera­
tions and employees and were p©sitH*ing themaglvti to continue to fight 
for the new routes mai profits e n ded to p u n c h m  fm\ efficient eguie-
Although the industry was stabilized he camper 1 sen to the Hfly peri­
od after deregulation, it a m  still changing quite rmpidiy. O c s u r r t n m  
in the early lidOs produced many changes in the airline industry. Each 
change left both positive and negative effects depending m  the point of 
view the change was observed from. Because of this, there still remains 
much controversy over the value of deregulation.
One of the major changes that occurred was the way 1n which 
communities were served. Although many small communities gained service, 
others lost a large portion of their previous service which caused finan­
cial hardship within the community. One of these communities was the d t y  
of Bakersfield, located in California's San Joaquin Valley, which lost 
service 1n 1980. It 1s located 100 miles from Los Angeles and 300 miles 
from San Francisco. It has 225,000 resldetns of which a large number are 
executives that need "feeder" service to the large city airports.
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Because of the need for commuter travel, when United st s
three dally round-trips to San Granclso and Its Bakersfield tc An­
geles service, the city suffered. United's pullout was coupled with 
Hughes AlrWest pullout of the city's only out of state service to Las 
Vegas.
These service stoppages badly damaged the Bakersfield economy. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation's 011 and Gas Division halted an expan­
sion project and threatened to move its 400-person headquarters elsewhere 
because of the air travel uncertainties. In 1980, a celebrity tennis 
tournament moved north to Fresno because of the airline situation. Several 
companies that recently moved to Bakersfield said they regretted their de­
cisions.
The C.A.B. did guarantee air service ~o local service was provided 
by A1r Pacific Incorporated, a new commuter line that owned four small 
planes and serves four San Joaquin Valley towns— all abandoned by United. 
The service provided was less than adequate, however. The day after Air 
Pacific started Bakersfield service the company's only pilot qualified to 
fly A1r Pacific's 50-passenger plane reached h1s monthly flying quota and 
was grounded. The airline resumed service by using one of Its 19-passen­
ger planes. These were a large drop from United's 100 passenger planes.
Occidental claimed that A1r Pacific could not be relied on. They 
claimed that the planes ran late and were usually heavily booked. Occi­
dental spends over one million dollars a year on air fare from Bakersfield 
and it feels 1t should be supplied with adequate service.
A1r Pacific claimed it was not getting a fair assessment. After the
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first few weeks Its on-’ me performance was ninety-three percent and load
factors were a normal fifty-five to sixty percent. It also had set up
new ticketing and baggage transfer deals with major carriers that made
connections simpler. The airline was flying two hundred seats a day which
was close to United's three hundred seats a day.
Bakersfield is now suing the C.A.B. to force United back while at
the same time it is trying to obtain service from new carriers. The C.A.B.
admits deregulation 1s not working in Bakersfield. Special counsel David
K1rste1n for the C.A.B. stated," It‘s probably our most serious transi- 
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tion problem."
Bakersfield is an extreme example of the effects of deregulation.
Many cities have lost service only to gain 1t back at as good a level or 
better. Still other cities have more service than before without losing 
any of the original service.
During the first year of deregulation proposals were made to drop 
service to 170 communities, 79 of which had other service. At 56 of the 
79 cities commuter airlines stepped 1n but often with smaller planes and 
less reliable service.
Some of the hardest hit of thse communities were not small towns 
but were medium-sized cities that lost a large number of scheduled flights. 
The C.A.B. has the power to acquire a transitional level of service which 
It 1s beginning to use 1n cases such as Bakersfield to allow the commute** 
lines time to work out problems they might have 1n starting service.
Service losses to these cities, however, Is offset by gains made by
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other cities. Reno, Nevada had not had a new airline in 17 years but 
it went from three to ten 1n the first year after deregulation passed.
The city is booming because it has more travelers who stay longer in 
their hotels and who spend more money than automobile travelers. Also, 
Reno's runways are being expanded and a new airport hotel is being built 
to try to attract even more travelers.
Another city that gained service is Orlando, Florida. During 1980 
service tripled and passenger traffic increased 24 percent a month. Be­
cause of the tremendous growth a new airport opened in 1981 and a conven­
tion center 1s planned to be built next to it.
Even communities that have gained traffic have lost some convenien­
ces due to being serviced by smaller carriers. An example 1s the reduction 
in air cargo capacity of small airplanes and £ reduction in the number of 
air cargo flights flow. Philadelphia gained five new airlines during 1980
but 1t lost many cargo flights that same year. This caused an Increase in
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air freight trucked to New York for shipment.
Another major change 1n the Industry was the large growth in small
airlines. In the first four years of deregulation 16 jet-flying passenger
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airlines were started versus none 1n the previous 20 years.
This 1s partially due to the nobility of the airplane as an asset.
If one route 1s not profitable an airline can easily fly a different m w  
profitable route. This also allows small carriers to use larger planes 
and fly longer routes since a few different routes can be tried at flrit 
to find he most profitable one. This allows small airHhis to expand 
and grow more profitable.
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During the first four years after deregulation, market share of 
the nine major airlines with annual revenues over one billion dollars 
dropped from 95 percent to 87 percent.
The small airlines are succeeding by offering service to markets
not served by the major trunklines. One of these new airlines 1n
Hawaiian Pacific that offers non-stop service to Honolulu from as far
East as New 'ork City. After only two weeks of promotion it claimed to
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have booked over 12.8 million dollars worth of tickets.
Price 1s the major advantage of these minor carriers. Hawaiian 
Pacific charges only 338 dollars for a round trip ticket between Honolulu 
and Denver versus 700 dollars for the major airlines. Often the prices 
are so low that they cover nothing more than the seat the passenger uses. 
People Express charges three dollars to check a bag and fifty cents for 
a coke.
These low prices forced the major trunk carriers to offer discount 
fares even though this reduced their profits. Discount fares are current­
ly available on eighty-eight percent of all U.S. flights.
The reason why the new carriers are cheaper Is because they have 
lower overhead costs. Host are non-union with some flight attendants1 
si series being as much as 3,000 dollars lower than for major carriers. A 
pilot for a small carrier can earn over 65,000 dollars less than h1s coun­
ter part on a major airline.
The workers agree to such low pay because they are betting on the 
future of the airline they work for. Many new airlines give their workers 
shares of stock 1n the company and a percentage of the profits. Therefore,
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the more the airline makes, the more the workers make. This Is why work­
ers often handle several jobs for the same airline.
Deregulation has caused the Industry to split Into three distinct 
categories of airlines: 1.) major trunklines; 2.) regional airlines, 
and 3.) commuter airlines. Each type of airline supplies a different type 
of service that 1s basically Independent of the others. This separation 
between services supplied causes economic shifts to effect each type of 
airline differently. This 1s why regional and commuter airlines have 
shown profits during the early 19801s while the major airlines have shown 
losses.
Major airlines supply transportation to and from major cities all 
across the United States. Regional airlines generally fly larger planes 
and often compete directly with major trunklines In a specific region. Com­
muter airlines generally have smaller aircraft and are used to bring "feed­
er” traffic to major airports.
Each of these two types has separate reasons for their success during 
the 1980's. Regionals have succeeded because:
— Trunk airlines power which looks so overwhelming the beginning 
was not nearly so effective 1n Individual markets. Regional 
airlines usually had an equal share of market power 1n Individ­
ual markets.
Regional airlines that realized such specialized markets 
were their source of strength became even more successful, while 
those that tried to take on the majors In other markets tended 
to suffer difficulties.
— Regional airline fleets generally are fuel-efficient and 
well tailored to route systems, while trunk airline fleets 
tend to force them Into highly competitive, unprofitable 
markets. And, while the trunks moved Into longer, denser 
markets, they left smaller markets that were perfect for 
regional airline fleets.
— Regional airlines have looked more closely at Individual 
markets' profitability Instead of being as concerned as 
the trunks about remaining or becoming the largest airline 
or having the most extensive route system or newest equip­
ment.
— Regional airlines, much more than trunks, have been willing 
and able to experiment.
— In many cases, regional airlines were not burdened with the 
trunk's high union pay scale. In others, reglonals were 
willing to take lengthy strikes to hold down labor costs.
— Regional airlines already had developed naturally the hub- 
and-spoke route system that 1s now considered Imperative 
to profitability.*0
These reaons differ greatly from the reasons commuters have succeeded 
which are:
— deregulation systematized the transition from service from 
certified airlines to service by c o m t e r  airlines.
— The act allowed commuter airlines to operate aircraft with 
seating capacities for as many as sixty passengers.
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— Large airlines were required to provide joint fares 
with commuter airlines under a set formula based on 
mileage. Without the provision, commuters would have 
to negotiate Individually the joint fare division with 
the larger airlines. Commuter officials believe their 
lack of clout would have meant less attractive divisions 
for the commuter lines If there were any joint feres at 
all.31
A third change 1n the airline Industry during the 19M's Is a reduction 
In the number of flights allowed due to the Professional Atr Traffic Contrail 
ers's strike In August 1981. At that time over 12,900 of the 17,906 union 
members went out on an Illegal strike. The Keegan Administration quickly 
fired the striking workers and replaced than with military controllers, sopor* 
visors, recently retired workers, and a giant computer system that Maps con­
stant track of supply and demand for airspace at Use nations' airports.
The Federal Aviation Administration fools that to reach pre-strike 
capacity it needs 14,000 controllers. Because 1t only hos about 11,000 
presently, air traffic has boon cut to about 95 percent of Its 1981 level.
It does not feel that 1981 capacity will bo returned until late 1n 1984.
This drop In allowable flights was originally thought to bo a boon 
for the major airlines because It gave them a good excuse to cutback unpro­
fitable routes. Also, because airplanes must be cleared through the com­
puter before takeoff, fuel costs are down since delays occur before takeoff.
It cost 1350 dollars for a 727 to hold a circular holding pattern fo" one 
hour.
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Profits did not occur, however, because most airlines replace 
smaller planes with larger ones on major routes so that seating capacity 
Is only down 'lx percent. This shirt 1n planes coupled with the weak eco­
nomy of the aarly 1980's dropped the load factor of most routes enough so 
that today most major carriers are still shewing losses.
The fourth major change during the 1980's was tne bankruptcy of 
Branlff Airlines In 1982. It was caused by throe major problems with the 
airline. The first was a tremendous cash flow bind that It hoped to ease 
by offering a two-for-one bargain, but the deal required early ticket pay­
ment. American Airlines ruined this strategy by offering the same bargain 
but to more cities and with a later payment requirement. This caused the 
Branlff strategy to fall.
The second cause of failure was Branlff's low domestic yield of only 
9.5 cents per passenger mile. Although costs were only seven cents per 
■rile, this was below the Industry's two-to-one yield to cost ratio that 
Is needed to show a profit. This meant that either Branlff needed e five 
cents per mile cost or a twelve camts per mile yield.
The final reason for Branlff's failure was brought about by tha grow­
ing power of the travel agent. This 1s the final major change In the air­
line Industry during the early igBO's and 1t was brought about by the trend 
for quick fare changes and the many discounts offsred. These trends forced 
travelers to rely on travel agents 1n order to obtain the lowest fere pos­
sible.
Travel agents remembered the closing of Laker Airways which left many 
stranded passangers. This caused many to stop using Branlff so that by
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the day of bankruptcy business from travel agents was down 40 to 50 per­
cent from 1981.
The bankruptcy of Branlff showed the i"*Jor a1r11n#s th#t now* of
. . ,.u»d by the Federel Government
them, no matter how big, was going to be save
Dereulatlon would be allowed to run Its cour*e ‘
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IV. DISCUSSION OVER DEREGULATION
The value of deregulation 1s difficult to Judge because each change 
it caused brought about both winners and losers. Small airline* and con­
sumers have benefitted while business and discretionary travellers, air 
line employees, and large airlines have suffered.
As mentioned earlier, regional and commuter airlines have had a strong 
growth rate. Also, many new email airlines were started while some older 
small carriers moved from noncertlfled to certified status.
Also, with small carriers, consumers who were paying their c e  way 
and only cared about basic transportation have benefitted greatly from de­
regulation. Some of these benefits are:
— Overall average airline fares Increased fourty-seven 
point three percent between 1977 and 1982 while the con­
sumer price index Increased fifty point four percent, the 
cost of operating an automobile Increased fifty-seven point 
three percent, and the cost of buying a train ticket In­
creased sixty-four point nine percent according to the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
— Airline costs, which formed the base for setting air­
line fares before deregulation, have Increased sixty-seven 
point seven percent since 1977, but air fares have Increased 
only forty-seven point three percent.
— More than sixty percent of all airline passengers now 
are able to take advantage of some form of discount, com­
pared with about thirty percent 1n 1976.
— Airline fares In 1980, the last year from which the 
calculations were made, were well below what they would 
have been under the domestic passenger fare Investigation 
formula that was used to set fares before deregulation, ac­
cording to the C.A.B.
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— Consumers saved three point three billion dollars 
on dlf f a m  In 1981, compared with what fares would 
been under previous C.A.B. regulation according 
to the A1r transport Association.
— Passengers had a multitude of alternatives for 
travel In most markets, ranging from full-fere and first 
class service similar to that before deregulation to the 
no frills service offered by some of the new entrants.
The alternatives allowed consumers to tailor the air ser­
vice they received to their personal finances flexibility 
and needs.
— large airline markets, which carry most airline pas­
sengers, hed more flights and more seats available from 
more different airlines.
— Those living 1n smaller cities often had mere direct 
service te regional hubs, insteed of making multi-stop 
"milk runs". Service between nen-hub alrperts and major 
nubs increesed two point Sevan percent and non-hubs to 
medium hubs Increased point six percent from June, 1978, 
to June, 1981, 11g drops wore b etween non-hubs end email 
hubs (-12,9*) and between two wen-hubs (-ld.2t),
— The number of momseoly airline markets decreased 
sixty-nine percent b e M i i  1978 and 1981, and the «m*er  
served by only two or tftndf carriers decreased seventy-one 
percent. At the seme thee, the number of marmots served 
by four or mere carriers impressed from 258 te 1327, an 
increased of femr hundred seventeen percent.
— The same percentage of passengers was able to *mke 
direct flights to destinations as before deregulation, 
and of those who were forced to connect, twenty-five per­
cent more were able to make the connections on the same 
airline.
— Roughly the same percentage of cities was accessible 
to one-day business trips overall as before deregulation, 
according to a study by the Rational Economic Research 
Associates Incorporated. The rtudy said cities that be­
came less accessible were balanced by the number that be­
came more accessible.
— The gap between airline fares and the consumer price 
Index widened even more 1n the first guarter of 1982, 
when airline fares dropped seven percent while the con­
sumer price Index Increased eight percent, according to
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George W. James, senior vice president-economics of A1r 
Transport Association. 34
Although the average consumer has benefitted, the businessman 
has suffered having to now contend with more crowding, poorer food, 
and longer waits for reservations and ticketing.
Discretionary travelers have suffered too. This is caused because:
— First-class fares have increased faster than inflation since
deregulation, and fewer first-class seats are available.
— Airlines passed fifty-one point three percent of their 
cost increases on to consumers in the form of fare increases 
1n the five years before 1976, and seventy-one point one 
percent 1n the five years since 1976, according to a General 
Accounting Office study.
— Even though fares overall were below what they would 
have been In a regulated environment in 1980, fares in the 
smallest markets were twelve percent above what they would 
have Lien without deregulation.
— While passengers in markets carrying three thousand 
or more passengers per day paid average fares of seven 
point eight cents per mile 1n 1981, those in markets with 
one hundred to three hundred paid nearly eighteen cents 
per mile, and those in markets with fewer than one hundred 
paid twenty-three point two pents per mile.
— The total number of markets receiving single-plane ser­
vice dropped from 2,513 in December, 1978, to 1,460 1n 
December, 1981, after the air traffic controller strike.
— Many of the smaller markets that retained air service 
lost jet service, which was replaced by propeller powered 
commuter aircraft. 35
Airline employees were also deregulation losers. Between 1979 and 
1981, 30,000 employees have lost their jobs. The actual number from large 
trunklines 1s higher because new airlines have rehired some laid-off em­
ployees.
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Even workers that did not lose their jobs have been forced to take 
pay and benefit cuts to keep their airline from going bankrupt. This Is 
a large contrast from regulatory times when employee's pay and benefits 
Increased faster than Inflation.
The major airlines also are suffering. After earning profits since 
1976 the airlines took record losses 1n 1980, 1981 and the beginning of 
1982. In 1980 the major airlines had a combined loss of 250 million dol­
lars. The losses dropped to 150 million dollars 1n 1981 but then hit 500 
million dollars during the first three months of 1982.
Major carriers market share has dropped from 88 percent before de­
regulation to 80 percent today. This has caused heavy losses for the ma-
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jor airlines while smaller carriers have been making strong profits.
As a response to the many problems major airlines have had In the 
1980's, some people are trying to reinstate some forms of regulation of 
the industry. Industry publications point to the large operating losses 
and even bankruptcy of some of the major carriers as proof that deregula­
tion 1s falling. 8ecause fare discounting 1s going on still, advocates of 
deregulation call for a minimum price floor on certain routes th-t will 
allow major carriers to regain profits. These profits can then be used to 
stabilize the Industry by allowing the purchase of new fuel efficient jets 
that will allow still more profits.
They believe that airlines cannot handle the freedom to set faros
and routes that deregulation gave them in 1978, Says Melvin Sronner, a
former senior vice president of Trans World Airlines: "Carriers have been
encouraged to cut into each other’s business 1n a self-destructive pattern
37
that results in an unhealthy and inefficient Industry."
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Brenner said that 85 percent of the airlines are losing money and 
that they have accumulated a four billion dollar debt since deregulation 
went Into effect. He says that deregulation has led to reduced service 
on certain routes and to too many flights on others which has resulted 
in over capacity.
Some of the discounts offered on tickets are below levels needed 
tor a net profit on the route. Brenner feels that a commission should be 
formed that will be able to veto unreasonably low fares.
Another advocate of deregulation 1s the president of the Air Lines 
Pilots Association, J. J. O'Connell. He feels that airline problems will 
increase in the future and points to a survey 1n which 59 percent of airport 
operators said that fare discrimination 1s the primary air service problem.
He feels that airlines have abandoned routes which have left many 
areas with Inadequate air service.
O'Donnell wants the C.A.B. to establish a price floor below which air­
lines cannot set fares. He feels that this will stop the irrational pric­
ing of tickets.
The reason why people feel that fare competition should be stopped is 
that 1t has not Increased load factors as much as 1t was felt 1t would 1n 
1978. After an Initial Increase, load factors are now slipping. In 1980 
they were 59.1 percent of capacity but that slipped to 58.7 percent 1n 1981 
and many feel this 1s the pattern of the future. By February 1982 Pan Am's 
load factor slipped to 54.8 from 60.8 percent 1n 1981. Because load fac­
tors had not increased, the airlines have been stripping themselves of 
profits by offering large discounts.
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Most airline offldiis disagree with t M s  argument and feel that 
the discount fares are keeping load factors higher than they would other* 
wise be. They point out that load factors went from 56 percent before 
deregulation to 62.8 percent in 1979. They feel that the drop since 
then, down to 57.5 percent 1n 1981 1s due to the recession and that load 
factors will again Increase rapidly once the economy recovers.
These airline officials blame factors other than the drop 1n reve­
nues from fare discounts for their troubles. They blame such factors as:
— The fuel crisis and the decontrol of fuel prices caused 
a 150 percent price Increase since deregulation, from forty 
cents per ga Ion to one dollar per gallon. Since 1972, fuel 
prices have Increased more than 800 percent, according to 
A1r Transport Association figures.
— Airlines continue to operate at only eighty-three per­
cent of pre-strike capacity at the largest airports which 
generally are the hubs for the major airlines. Capacity has 
been restricted for more than a year because of the air traf­
fic controllers strike.
— Airline traffic 1s always sensitive to economic condi­
tions, and the United States economy has endured two reces­
sions in the past two»years.
— The recession-spawned weakening of traffic occurred 
just as an Influx of aircraft ordered during the profit­
making years began to come on line, creating an over-capacity 
situation. 39
Trunkline officials *1 so blame themselves for much of the problem of 
low load factors. Often, airlines made decisions to enter a route which 
seemed economically sound. Enough demand was found to justify the purchase 
of new aircraft on a new series of routes.
A problem often arose, however, because another airline would simul­
taneously reach the same conclusion. This led to over-capacity on many newly
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started routes.
Other management mistakes caused financial problems for major air­
lines. One of these mistakes was the purchase of w1de-bod1ed aircraft 
during the 1976-1978 years of record profits. According to chairman of 
U.S. A1r, "Perhaps the single biggest marketing error In the past twenty
years was the assumption that the comfort of wide bodied aircraft would
39
be more Important to parsengers than frequent schedules. Not so." He
says that what 1s demanded of the Industry 1s convenience and price.
These wide-bodled airplanes, combined with movement of regional air­
lines Into longer markets, caused over capacity problems on longer routes 
with high load factors that had previously been large profit markets for 
major airlines.
This resulted 1n price and service competition that finally made a 
profit Impossible even under 100 percent load factors. Very few other 
routes were left 1n which wide bodied aircraft could fly profitably so that 
managers could do nothing but hold on and try to limit losses until other 
weaker airlines failed.
Management, however, 1s not the only cuase of problems for the major 
airlines. Many feel that an extended transition period was needed In going 
from a regulated to a deregulated environment. For example, a needed manage­
ment talent was the ability to convince the C.A.8. to grant additional 
routes to their airlines. After dereulatlon this skill was no longer needed.
Another problem caused by the quick transition was the ability of 
managers to do market analysis and financial projections of new rates quick­
ly. Before deregulation, management had months and even years to make their
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analysis of a route. After deregulation conditions on routes changed al­
most dally which required a different type of analysis than done 1n the 
past.
Probably the single major force against deregulation 1s, Ironically, 
the C.A.B. In Its 218 page study, Competition and the Airlines: An Evalu­
ation of Deregulation, the C.A.B. said deregulation allowed carriers to
restructure routes and pricing policies which result 1n airlines being more
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responsive to consumer demands.
This study found that as a result of deregulation:
^-Airlines are tailoring route networks to match traffic 
flows. One result of this 1s a greater share of connecting 
trips are now made on line.
— Commuter airlines have replaced jet operators 1n many 
thin, short-haul markets. Small communities where commuters 
have replaced jet operators have had a twenty-five percent 
Increase 1n flights on the average and a corresponding In­
crease 1n convenience.
— The Board’s Essential A1r Service program 1s providing 
small communities better service at lower taxpayer costs than 
the subsidy program 1t replaced.
— Carriers are tailoring the quality of service to meet 
market demand, and fares tend to reflect the costs of serv­
ing the market.
— The Increased use of peak-load pricing allows carriers 
to operate at higher load factors while providing high- 
quality service to passengers who demand 1t.
— The new airlines entering the Industry have substantial­
ly lower costs than the established airlines. It appears 
that regulation reduced the Incentives for efficiency, caus­
ing airline costs to become inflated.
— Convenience has increased In some markets and declined 
in others. The average traveler has experienced a small Im­
provement in convenience.
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— Spurred by competitive pressures as well as the recession, 
the established airlines are beginning to take steps to Im­
prove productivity.
— Although carriers 1n concentrated markets have some 
price-setting power, 1t tends to be moderate. Moreover, 
market concentration 1s declining. Increased price com- 
petition also has limited the amount of schedule rivalry.
The debate over deregulation has recently extended to Congress where 
legislators are considering some form of regulation to reestablish service 
to small communities and to stop price wars. Even though the Reagan Admini­
stration 1s committed to deregulation, Congress 1s still taking some action 
on this Issue.
Pending congressional activity on airline deregulation during 1983 In­
cludes:
— Possible legislation to reestablish service to small 
communities that were dropped by airlines after deregulation 
because of low traffic flow.
— Congressional pressure on the Reagan Administration to 
create a special commission to study the effects of deregu­
lation on the domestic airlines.
— Hearings to be held this spring by th House Public Works 
and Transportation aviation subcommittee or deregulation and 
the possibility of deregulating the a1rl;j^,, especially to 
provide service to sma11-and-med1um-s1zed communities that 
have lost air transportation since 1978. The hearings will 
be part of a congressional overview of economic regulatory 
Issues affecting U.S. airlines. 42
Whether or not these actions will lead to reregulatlon will depend
on the success or failure of the airline Industry during the time Congress
1s debating the Issues. If the major trunklines begin to show profits, re
regulation might not occur. If they keep struggling, however, Congress
* <%
might feel compelled to reregulate.
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V. CONCLUSION
On the surface regulation seems natural for the airline Industry. 
Capital Investment costs are very high and so are operating costs due 
to the need for a stable and frequent level of service. But deregula­
tion has shown that the Industry 1s not as weak as 1t appears on the 
surface. Operating costs have been cut at the same time fares were cut 
which kept the airlines from showing large losses. This shows that the 
Industry 1s able to adapt to deregulation at least to the extent that 
most major and mlnoe airlines will be able to continue operation until 
the economy and public policy stabilize.
At the present time 1t 1s hard to pass judgment on airline deregu­
lation. The theory on which the bill was based stated that passenger's 
demand for various types of service and price would and could 1 e met ef­
fectively by the airlines through competition. This theory did not, how­
ever. foresee the large rise 1n fuel costs, the cutback caused by the air 
traffic controllers' strike, the failure of w1de-bod1ed jets to be effec­
tive under deregulation, or the economic downturn during the 1980's.
These negative factors magnified the harmful effects of competition on 
the airline Industry. They caused airline costs to Increase rapidly 
while competition caused fares to decrease. Many airlines now operate 
at a loss with their only hope being a solid economic recovery. This has 
caused pressure to build for reregulation of the airline industry.
Other factors also cause people to feel the industry should be re­
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regulated. The first 1s the price Instability that exists today. Many 
feel that the Industry cannot run profitably unless prices stabilize.
This Mould allow long-range plans and large capital Investment plans to 
be made. With unstable pricing profitable routes which are counted on 
to supply cash for future planning might turn unprofitable within a mat­
ter of days. Many feel that the only way to gain price stability 1s 
through regulation.
The second factor 1s that although some communities have better ser­
vice than before deregulation, others have lost a great deal of service.
This 1s because many break even and low profit routes that were served 
before deregulation no longer pay since resources can now be concentrated 
on more profitable routes. Regulation could force airlines to serve these 
routes or 1t could make them more attractive to airlines by susldlzing ser­
vice or by giving added benefits when an airline provides service.
The question of whether or not to reregulate 1s Impossible to answer 
now since deregulation has yet to be tested fully. It succeeded Initially 
but then the economy was strong. It caused great problems during the 1980's 
but then the recession caused severe problems for many Industries. The 
answer can only be determined during a stable economy which 1s questionable 
at the present time. By the time 1t occurs, the Industry might be so 
desperate that regulation might not help. Also, regulation has not been 
proven to help the airlines during unstable economies. Many feel that de­
regulation 1s why the major air! es made 1t through the recent economic 
slump.
Only the future will determine whether or not deregulation 1s a posi­
tive force 1n the U.S. airline Industry— provided, of course, the Industry
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1s not reregulated before a determination can be made.
It should be noted that airlines also suffered heavy losses Inter­
nationally due to access problems on many foreign routes. Although these 
losses contribute to the airlines' current economic troubles and were 
brought about by deregulation of the international situation, they will 
be discussed in no greater detail. A discussion of this topic can be 
fo* id in "The U.S. International Airline Situation" an unpul 'shed paper 
this author for Political Science 290 during the Fall semester in 1983.
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APPENDIX
Hajor Provisions of the Deregulation Bill
Instructed the CAB to 1) place "maximum reliance" on competition 
1n its regulation of Interstate airline passenger service, so 
long as It continued to ensure the safety of air travel; 2.) pre­
serve service to small communities and rural areas, and 3) pre­
vent anti-competitive practices.
Required the CAB and the Transportation Department to recommend 
to Congress by Jan. 1, 1980, whether the states should be required 
to share the cost of federal subsidies Intended to preserve local 
air service.
Ordered the CAB to authorize new services that were "consistent 
with the public convenience and necessity."
Ordered the CAB to grant operating rights to any air carrier seeking 
to serve a route on which only one other carrier was actually providing 
service and on which other carriers were authorised to serve, but were 
not actually providing a specified minimum level of service.
If two or more airlines were actually providing service on such 
a route, the CAB was required to determine that granting add­
itional route authority was "consistent with the public conven­
ience and necessity" before permitting additional carriers to 
serve that route.
An airline not providing the specified minimum level of service 
on a route could begin providing such service and retain Its 
authority to serve that route. Otherwise, the CAB was required 
to revoke such unused authority.
Provided for an automatic market entry program, whereby airlines 
could begin service on one additional route each year during the 
period 1979-81 without formal CAB approval. Each carrier also 
was permitted to protect one of Its existing routes each year by 
designating It as not eligible for automatic market entry by 
another carrier.
Required an airline company to give the CAB notice of Its Intent 
to suspend or reduce service.
* Authorized the CAB to order an airline to continue to provide 
"essential air transportation service” and, for a 10-year 
period, to provide subsidies or seek other willing carriers 
In order to assure the continuation of essential service.
* Permitted carriers to lower rates SO percent below or 5 percent 
above the "standard Industry fare" without prior CAB approval.
* The standard Industry fare was defined as the fare 1n effect on 
July 1, 1977, subject to semi-annual CAB review. The CAB still 
was authorized to disallow a fare If It considered 1t to be 
predatory.
* Made persons employed by an air carrier for at least four years 
eligible for compensation for maximum of $1x years If they lost 
their jof >, had their wages cut or were forced to relocate due 
to Increased airline Industry competition brought on by enact­
ment of the deregulation bill.
* Exempted Interstate airlines from state regulation of rates and 
routes.
* Required the Transportation Department to report annually to 
Congress and CAB on Its Implementation of airline deregulation 
under S 2493.
* Required the CAB to report to Congress by May 1, 1979, on 
whether airlines should be permitted to sell tours to the public 
and to own and operate travel agencies.
* Set deadlines for many types of CAB actions, and ordered the 
CAB to simplify and speed up many of Its procedures.
* Permitted any carrier with planes carrying 30 or more passengers 
to provide through-baggage and through-ticketing services.
* Required the CAB to determine, within one year of the legislation's 
enactment, what It considered to be "essential air transportation" 
for each point served at the time of enactment. The board was 
authorized to re-evaluate and adjust, after consultation with local 
officials, what It considered as constituting essential air service 
In the future.
* Provided that, after Jan. 1, 1963, the amount of the subsidy paid 
an airline company based on Its carriage of U.S. mall had to take 
Into consideration the company's total revenues. The subsidy pro­
gram was operated by the CAB.
* Required the CAB to Impose rules and requirements on charter airlines
A-3
that were no more rigid than those It Imposed on other classes 
of air carriers.
* Required commuter aircraft to conform to the safety requirements 
Imposed on larger passenger aircraft "to the maximum feasible 
extent.1
* Exempted from most CAB regulation commuter aircraft weighing 
less than 18,000 pounds and carrying fewer than 56 passengers.
(The Federal Aviation Administration -- and not the CAB -- was 
charged with regulating airline safety under existing law.)
* Authorized the CAB to exempt certain classes of service from Its 
regulatory authority as It saw fit.
* Required CAB approval of airline consolidations, mergers, purchases, 
leases, operating contracts and acquisitions. The burden of proving 
the anti-competitive effects of such actions was placed on the party 
challenging an action. Airline company acquisitions by non-a1r11ne 
companies were exempted from the CAB's authority.
* Required the CAB to approve all Inter-company agreements affecting 
air transportation, and ordered the cAB not to approve any agreement 
served a "serious transportation need" or provided "an Important pub­
lic benefit."
* Prohibited the CAB from renewing the airline mutual aid pact unless 
the benefits It provided an airline company closed down by a labor 
strike did not exceed more than 60 percent of the company's direct 
operating expenses Incurred during the strike. Pact members also 
were required to agree to submit Issues causing a strike to binding 
arbitration If the striking employees requested binding arbitration.
* Limited the president's ability to disapprove CAB recosmendatlons con­
cerning International route awards. Under the legislation, the presi­
dent could disapprove the CAB's recommendation solely on the basis of 
"foreign relations or national defense consideration.
* Authorized the CAB, the Transportation Department and the Treasury 
Department to withhold from public disclosure, on request of any 
Individual, Information contained In any document or application 
given the government that might prejudice the U.S. position 1n any 
International air negotiations.
* Required the CAB to report to Congress by Jan. 1, 1984, on the 
Implementation of deregulation, and whether the board should be 
abolished.
* Hade commuter and Intrastate air carriers eligible for the existing 
federal loan guarantae program, and extended the program for five 
years.
a = ~ > V  8 * ; / ;i s :t f : a a k  ■ »  ; i .W f f B A ? ‘■ S S ?
-
"
■
; '
s 1-4 arc fraa R. Lories Jrs., article "Mho the airlines will cope with deregulation" 
fortune. Vol. » ,  R o w d ier 20. 1978. pp. 38-41
Figure 2
Ffgu**e $
MMMNM.
